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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAHf

;

Plaintiff-Appellee,

:

v.

:

MICHAEL SAMUEL WEAVER,

:

Case No. 900284-CA

Category No. 2

Defendant-Appellant. :

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction of theft, a third
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1990).
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(f) (Supp. 1990), as the appeal is from a
district court in a criminal case not involving a conviction of a
first degree felony.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Did the trial court correctly determine that the
affidavit in support of the search warrant established probable
cause for the search of defendant's mother's residence?

The

standard of review to examine a trial court's determination of
the sufficiency of an affidavit in support of a search warrant is
whether the lower court was clearly in error.

State v.

Stromberqf 783 P.2d 54, 57 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), cert, denied,
795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
The language of the provisions upon which the State
relies is included in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 15, 1989, defendant was arrested and charged
with one count of burglary, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1990) and one count of theft, a
second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404
(1990) (Record [hereafter R.] at 9). On September 27, 1989,
defendant filed a motion to suppress the evidence* seized from the
premises at 1316 East 3900 South (R. at 33).

Subsequently, on

October 17, 1989, defendant entered into a plea agreement in
which count I was dismissed and defendant entered a conditional
guilty plea to theft, a second degree felony, and agreed to pay
restitution (R. at 39-45).

However, on November 13, 1989, the

trial court allowed defendant to withdraw his guilty plea and the
case was remanded to the Circuit Court for preliminary hearing
(R. at 49).
On February 26, 1990, defendant pled not guilty to
counts I and II as originally charged in the information (R. at
51).

Following a suppression hearing on March 15, 1990, the

trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress (R. at 52-53).
The matter was tried by jury on March 27 and 28, 1990, in the
Third Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County, the Honorable
J. Dennis Frederick, district judge, presiding (R. at 89-90).
The jury found defendant guilty of theft, a third degree felony,
a lesser included offense of count II of the information (R. at
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95).

Defendant was sentenced on April 9, 1990 to a term in the

Utah State Prison not to exceed five years (R. at 123).
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On May 7, 1989, Deputy Gary Cummings of the Salt Lake
County Sheriff's Department was dispatched to Dustyfs Vans at
3405 South State in response to a call made by the security guard
(Transcript of the trial [hereafter R. 147] at 13).

Shortly

after his arrival, Deputy Cummings was met by Dave Torgerson, the
shop service manager (R. 147 at 14, 20). They found that the
front door had been pried open, a candy machine had been broken
into, and televisions and videocassette players had been removed
from a shelf (R. 147 at 21-22).

During a follow-up investigation

conducted by Deputy Les Powers, Mr. Torgerson completed an
inventory of the missing items and their value (R. 147 at 23-24).
Around noon on May 7, 1989 some of the business's
employees spoke with Jay and Linda Lawrence to see if they had
seen or heard anything regarding the burglary (R. 147 at 46-47).
The Lawrences lived in a four-plex at 3391 South Edison Street,
directly behind Dusty's Vans (R. 147 at 43).

Upon learning that

the Lawrences had both seen and spoken with defendant, the
employees notified the police (R. 147 at 47).

The Lawrences then

described their encounter with defendant to Deputy Gary Sterner
(R. 147 at 50). Mrs. Lawrence explained that she was awakened
early on the morning of May 7, 1989 by the clanking of the fence
outside her bedroom window (R. 147 at 43).

When she looked out,

she saw a man climbing back and forth over the fence to Dusty's,
carrying items (R. 147 at 44). Mrs. Lawrence then awakened her
husband (R. 147 at 45). He reported:
-3-

Well, I saw this guy jumping over a fence,
throwing things over, and then jumping over,
and I yelled something like, "Hey, what's
going on over there?"
•

• •

He walked up to the lawn and — let's see, he
says, "These people," referring to Dusty's
Vans, "had ripped me off and I'm just getting
back at them."
•

• •

He went over and threw his stuff into his
truck, the last, you know, little load that
he was carrying, and drove off.
(R. 147 at 35).

Both Mr. and Mrs. Lawrence described defendant

as wearing a tank top, tennis shoes and either shorts or cut-offs
on the morning of the burglary (R. 147 at 36, 47). They also
described defendant's truck as "a blue, small truck . . . [that]
didn't have license plates on it" and "a blue Mitsubishi truck
with a new sticker in the window" (R. 147 at 36, 46). At trial,
the Lawrences each identified defendant as the man they saw
jumping the fence and removing property from Dusty's Vans on the
morning of May 7, 1989 (R. 147 at 36, 45).
On May 7, 1989, Deputy Sterner investigated the
burglary at Dusty's Vans (R. 147 at 49-50).

As part of that

investigation, he spoke with Dave Torgerson and interviewed Mr.
and Mrs. Lawrence (R. 147 at 50).

At five-thirty that afternoon,

Deputy Sterner saw a truck similar to that described by the
Lawrences (R. 147 at 50).

The driver of the truck also fit the

description of defendant given by the Lawrences (R. 147 at 51).
Deputy Sterner stated:
I followed [the truck] and then made a
traffic stop, pulled it over and obtained ID
from the driver.
-4-

[The name was] Michael S. Weaver.
• • •

I just asked him where he was going, asked
him for his ID. I went back and ran the ID
for warrants, returned it to him and let him
go.
.

• •

I wrote out a field card, added that to my
report and sent a note in to the deputies —
or detective division.
(R. 147 at 51-52).
On May 11, 1989, after receiving the report from Deputy
Sterner, Detective Powers displayed a photo spread for the
Lawrences in which both Jay and Linda Lawrence positively
identified defendant as the person they had seen on the morning
of the burglary (R. 147 at 54-55).

Detective Powers also

contacted defendant's parole officer, Sally Powell, and had her
check the records on defendant's electronic surveillance (R. 147
at 69).

Those records showed that defendant left his home at

6:24 on the morning of May 7, 1989 (R. 147 at 70).

Ms. Powell

also told Detective Powers that defendant frequented his mother's
residence which was near his own residence (R. 147 at 56).

Based

to this information, Detective Powers sought a search warrant to
check defendant's mother's residence for any of the stolen items
(R. 147 at 56).

Detective Powers obtained a search warrant in

the third circuit court for Salt Lake County (Defendant's Exhibit
[hereafter Def. Exh.] #1; a copy is attached as Addendum A ) . The
warrant was executed on May 12, 1989 (R. 147 at 56).
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At

defendant's mother's residence, officers found a five-inch Cosmo
TV in the home and various televisions and videocassette players
in a shed adjacent to the carport (R. 147 at 58-59 and State's
Exhibit [hereafter St. Exh.] # 5, 6, and 7).

Those items were

identified as coming from the burglary of Dusty's Vans (R. 147 at
29-30).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Since the Utah Supreme Court has specifically adopted
the Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), totality-of-thecircumstances test for challenges to search warrant affidavits,
this issue need not be analyzed separately under the Utah
Constitution.

Using the Gates test, this affidavit provides

sufficient information to establish probable cause for issuance
of the warrant.

The hypertechnical dissection that defendant

attempts to make of the affidavit on appeal has been rejected by
this jurisdiction.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE SEARCH WARRANT AFFIDAVIT ESTABLISHED
SUFFICIENT PROBABLE CAUSE TO SUPPORT THE
ISSUANCE OF THE SEARCH WARRANT
Defendant claims that the trial court erred in denying
his motion to suppress evidence resulting from a search of his
mother's residence.

He asserts that the affidavit for the search

warrant issued for his mother's residence was invalid and
therefore issued in violation of his state and federal
constitutional rights.
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A.

Standard of Review

Defendant raised his invalidity of the affidavit
argument in a suppression hearing before the trial court on March
15, 1990.

The trial court denied defendant's motion stating:
This court is of the view that thte
[sic] affidavit in support of the warrant
contains sufficient reliable information to
have provied [sic] the magistrate with a
substantial basis for determining the
existence of probable cause. The magistrate
was able to make a reasonable determination
that there was a fair probability that
evidence of a crime would be found at the
residence identified.
This court is not prusuaded [sic] that
those executing the warrant exceeded their
authority.

(Record [hereafter R.] at 53).

To overturn this ruling, this

Court must find that the trial court's factual evaluation
underlying its decision to deny defendant's motion to suppress
was clearly erroneous.

This Court addressed the standard of

review in State v. Stromberq, 783 P.2d 54 (Utah Ct. App. 1989),
cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990):
When a search warrant is subsequently
challenged on the grounds that it was issued
without the requisite probable cause . . .
"the fourth amendment does not require that
the reviewing court conduct a de novo review
of the magistrate's probable cause
determination." [State v.] Babbell, 770 P.2d
[987] at 991 [(Utah 1989)]. Rather, the
determination is "whether the magistrate had
a substantial basis to conclude that in the
totality of circumstances, the affidavit
adequately established probable cause for the
issuance of a search warrant." State v.
Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
Moreover, in making this determination, the
reviewing court is to give the magistrate's
decision "great deference." Ld. (quoting
Gates, 462 U.S. at 236).
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Our role in reviewing that determination is
limited: "Because a trial court is in an
advantageous position to assess witness
credibility, 'we will not disturb its factual
assessment underlying a decision to . . .
deny a suppression motion unless it clearly
appears that the lower court was in error.'"
[State v.3 Droneberg, 120 Utah Adv. Rep. 27,
28 [(Utah Ct. App. October 20, 1989)]
(quoting State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258
(Utah 1987)). Clear error is indicated when
the trial court's factual assessment is
against the clear weight of the evidence or
induces a firm conviction that a mistake has
been committed. Ashe, 745 P.2d at 1258.
783 P.2d at 57. The record in the present case supports the
finding of the trial court.

Since the trial court's ruling

upholding the search warrant is not clearly erroneous, this Court
should defer to the trial court's determination.
B.

Probable Cause Determination

Defendant analyzes his challenge to the trial court's
probable cause determination separately under the United States
and the Utah Constitutions, based on his interpretation of State
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460 (Utah 1990).

Larocco involves

warrantless searches and expresses concern felt by the Utah
Supreme Court with the direction federal law is moving on that
issue.

The courts of this state have never expressed a similar

concern about the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances test.

In

fact, this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have specifically
adopted and applied that test.

See State v. Brown, 143 Utah Adv.

Rep. 24 (Utah Ct. App. Sep. 12, 1990); State v. Anderton, 668
P.2d 1258, 1261 (Utah 1983); State v. Anderson, 701 P-2d 1099,
1101 (Utah 1985).

The courts of this state have expressed

concern over exceptions to the warrant requirement; they have
_Q_

never expressed concern over the test used to evaluate probable
cause determinations.

See Stromberg, 783 P.2d at 57.

Consequently, the State will cite to and analyze both federal and
state law in support of the trial court's determination that this
affidavit established probable cause.
The fourth amendment to the United States Constitution
and article I, § 14 of the Utah Constitution both require a
finding of "probable cause supported by oath or affirmation"
prior to issuance of a search warrant.

State v. Miller, 740 P.2d

1363, 1365 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah
1987).

Accordingly, probability, not conclusive evidence, is the

basis upon which a search warrant may be issued.

When the Utah

Supreme Court addressed the issue of probable cause in State v.
Tapp, 26 Utah 2d 392, 490 P.2d 334 (1971), it stated:
[I]t is not necessary that the affiant have
certain knowledge of the commission of crime
or of the location of evidence incident
thereto. It is only required that there be
sufficient knowledge of the probability
thereof that a person of reason and prudence
would act thereon.
490 P.2d at 337. Subsequently, the Court has said, "probability,
not a prima facie showing, of criminal activity is the standard
of probable cause for issuance of a search warrant."
Fort, 572 P.2d 1387, 1389 (Utah 1977).

State v.

See also United States v.

Dill, 693 F.2d 1012, 1014 (10th Cir. 1982) ("Probable cause for a
search warrant is nothing more than a reasonable belief that the
evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the
policeman's affidavit.").

In State v. Anderton, 668 P.2d 1258

(Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the totality-of-the-
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circumstance analysis espoused by the United States Supreme Court
in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983).

In addressing the

sufficiency of a probable cause finding, the United States
Supreme Court stated:
The task of the issuing magistrate is simply
to make a practical, common-sense decision
whether, given all the circumstances set
forth in the affidavit before him, including
the '•veracity" and "basis of knowledge" of
persons supplying hearsay information, there
is a fair probability that contraband or
evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place. And the duty of a
reviewing court is simply to ensure that the
magistrate had a "substantial basis for . . .
conclud[ing]" that probable cause existed.
462 U.S. at 238-239 (quoting Jones v. United States, 362 U.S.
257, 271 (I960)).

The Court decried hypertechnical analysis of

warrants, saying:
"A grudging or negative attitude by reviewing
courts toward warrants," Ventresca, 380 U.S.,
at 108, . . . is inconsistent with the Fourth
Amendment's strong preference for searches
conducted pursuant to a warrant; "courts
should not invalidate warrant[s] by
interpreting affidavit[s] in a
hypertechnical, rather than a commonsense,
manner." Id.., at 109[.]
462 U.S. at 236 (other citations omitted).

Based on the

circumstances set forth in the affidavit in question, the issuing
magistrate in the present case could and did make a probable
cause determination with a substantial basis for concluding that
a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.

This is all that

the fourth amendment and article I, § 14 require.

Gates, 462

U.S. at 237.
Defendant's argument in the case at bar is based on the
allegation that in order to justify the search of his mother's
-10-

residence, the police attempted to form a nexus between
defendant's residence and his mother's residence • Defendant
appears to claim that the warrant was issued solely on an
allegation made by Ms, Sally Powell, "that on May 11, 1989,
defendant made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses and in
fact was at the house to be searched on the evening of May 10,
1989" (Def. Exh. #1, p. 3; also included as Addendum A).

This

dissection of the affidavit which defendant urges on this Court
is the hypertechnical analysis rejected in Gates, The affidavit,
viewed in its totality, is not merely Ms, Powell's information.
Defendant was identified as the person taking items from the
property of Dusty's Vans.

Defendant was on Intensive Supervision

Parole and his parole officer informed the affiant that defendant
had made five to six trips between his own residence and that of
his mother on May 11, 1989.

The affiant also had reason to

believe that defendant could be expecting a search by his parole
officer at any time; consequently, it was probable that he would
hide the stolen property at a different location.

The close

proximity of defendant's mother's house to his, coupled with the
numerous trips between the homes on May 11, gave probable cause
for the magistrate to allow a search of the mother's residence
(Def. Exh. #1, p. 3). The fact that there might have been
At the same time defendant makes his claim that a nexus was
manufactured by the police, he claims to have a privacy interest
in the place to be searched (Brief of Appellant at 12, footnote
5). If, in fact, defendant has a privacy interest in his
mother's residence, a sufficient nexus exists and defendant
cannot claim that he had insufficient ties to the place to be
searched for purposes of establishing probable cause. If
defendant has no privacy interest in the shed, he has no standing
to attack the search.
-11-

innocent explanations for defendant's trips between the homes
does not negate the finding of probable cause.

The law does not

require a certain knowledge on the part of the affiant or the
magistrate to justify a search warrant.

It only requires

probable cause.
Based on the circumstances set forth in the affidavit
in question, the issuing magistrate could and did make a probable
cause determination with a substantial basis for concluding that
a search would uncover evidence of wrongdoing.
POINT II
EVEN IF THIS SEARCH WARRANT WERE FOUND TO BE
DEFECTIVE, THE EVIDENCE FOUND IN THE SEARCH
IS STILL ADMISSIBLE UNDER UNITED STATES V.
LEON.
Even if the affidavit did not establish probable cause,
the evidence is admissible because the officers acted in good
faith under United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), when they
executed the search warrant.

Leon first expressed a good faith

exception to the exclusionary rule for evidence seized pursuant
to an illegal search.

The deterrent effect of exclusion of the

evidence is aimed at law enforcement agents, not magistrates.
468 U.S. at 917-18.

If a magistrate incorrectly determines that

probable cause has been established and issues the warrant, an
officer usually can rely on that determination; punishing an
officer for the magistrate's error does not accomplish the
purposes of the exclusionary rule.

468 U.S. at 921-22.

However,

the officer's reliance on the magistrate's determination must be
"objectively reasonable[.]"

468 U.S. at 922.
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The Supreme Court listed certain circumstances in which
the good faith exception would not apply.

The Court said:

Nor would an officer manifest objective good
faith in relying on a warrant based on an
affidavit "so lacking in indicia of probable
cause as to render official belief in its
existence entirely unreasonable."
468 U.S. at 923 (quoting Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 610-11
(1975)).
As was noted in Point I, the information given in the
affidavit was sufficient to establish probable cause for issuance
of the warrant.

Even if this court were to find that the

information given in the affidavit was insufficient to establish
probable cause, the information is not so lacking a$ to make the
officers' reliance thereon unreasonable.

The courts have

determined that reliance upon "bare bones" affidavits is
unreasonable and thus the good faith exception would not apply.
In Leon, the affidavit "related the results of an extensive
investigation" and "provided evidence sufficient to create
disagreement among thoughtful and competent judges as to the
existence of probable cause."

468 U.S. at 926. Wholly

conclusory statements in affidavits in previous cases were found
to be insufficient to establish probable cause.

Nathanson v.

United States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933); Aquilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108
(1964).

The affidavit in the present case is not so conclusory

or bare that an objectively reasonable officer would have doubted
that probable cause existed.

The affidavit contained the

statements of witnesses who identified defendant as the person
carrying items over the fence from Dusty's Vans; the statement of
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defendant's parole officer that defendant had made several trips
between his and his mother's residence on May 11; and a statement
of the affiant that defendant, a person on intensive supervision
as part of his parole, would probably hide the stolen property
away from his own residence. A magistrate and a district court
judge have determined that this supported a probable cause
finding.

Even assuming arguendo that this was not enough to

establish probable cause, it was at least sufficient to support
the officers' good faith reliance on the warrant signed by a
neutral and detached magistrate.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State respectfully requests
that this Court affirm defendant's conviction and sentence.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /i<fe" day of November,
1990.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Attorney General

CH&RLENE BARLOW
Assistant Attorney General
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of
the foregoing Brief of Appellee were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Karen Stam and Ronald S. Fujino, SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
Attorneys for defendant, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, Salt Lake
City, Utah 84111, this

; 5 ~ day of November, 1990.
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ADDENDUM A

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
By: GREGORY G. SKORDAS
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss
)

County of Salt Lake

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
BEFORE:

Sheila McCleve
JUDGE

450 South 2nd East
ADDRESS

The undersigned affiant being first duly sworn, deposes and says:
That he has reason to believe:
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the
eastmost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South. The duplex is
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence described as:
*^Lt,Two Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles);
^*0ne Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701;
/"-v .Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT01;
\&J*hOne Tote Vision VCP;
^"One 9" Samsung TV;
One 9" Sony TV;
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
CA\ •*£ Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
\ y rf«*Two Samsong VCP Model VP 2215.

(Continued on page 2)
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PAGE 2
AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
and that said property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acquired or is unlawfully possessed, or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct.
[Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]#
Affiant believes
evidence of the
Property.

the property and evidence described
above is
crime(s) of Burglary, Theft, Receiving Stolen

The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant
are:
Affiant, Leslie Kent Powers, is a detective with the Salt
Lake County Sheriff's Office and has been such for 1 1/2 years.
Affiant has been a deputy Salt Lake County Sheriff for 5 years.
Affiant is currently assigned as a burglary detective assigned as
such for the past 1 1/2 years with Salt Lake County. Affiant has had
extensive training with local law enforcement in the area of burglary
investigation.
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (Initial Report) of
Deputy Gary Cummings which alleges tht on or about May 7, 1989
someone entered into the east back building of Dusty's Vans at 3405
South State in Salt Lake County through the east doors. Entry was
made by prying a metal door. Joe Torres of Dusty1s Vans reports that
the forced entry was made between 2300 hours on May 6, 1989 and 1025
hours on May 7, 1989 and that the items listed above were removed
from the building, valued at well over $1,000.00.
Affiant has reviewed the report #89-42191 (follow-up report)
of Deputy Sterner which alleges that the deputy interviewed Dave
Torgerson
of Dusty 1 s
Vans who
located
two witnesses
to
the
above-referenced burglary.

(Continued on page 3)
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Affiant personally interviewed witnesses Jay Larance and
Linda Larance who stated that they were awakened at 700 hours on May
7 f 1989 by someone who was jumping back and forth over a fence
between her residence (apartment) and Dustyfs Vans. Both of these
witnesses observed the man who then got into a blue Mitsubishi truck,
with a temporary sticker in the rear window. The man was identified
as approximately 6f tall, in his 30's with short blonde hair wearing
shorts and a black tank top.
Affiant
showed
both
witnesses
a
photospread
including
Weaver's picture and he was positively identified by both witnesses
as the man described above, observed climbing the fence to Dusty1s
Vans.
Weaver
is currently
on
Intense
Supervised
Parole
for
Receiving Stolen Property and is supervised by Sally Powell from the
Department of Corrections.
Weaver resides at 1328 East 3900 South
with his grandmother.
Weaver's mother resides at the house to be
searched.
Affiant has interviewed Ms. Powell who alleges that on May
11, 1989, Weaver made numerous trips (5-6) between the houses and in
fact was at the house to be searched on the evening of May 10, 1989.
Affiant
alleges through his experience and belief that
Weaver, being on Intense Supervised Parole, would not keep stolen
property at his primary residence knowing that such a place could and
is routinely searched by Parole Officers. Further, affiant alleges
that
there
is probable cause, because of the
above-mentioned
circumstances and Weaver's activity, to believe that the stolen
property sought to be seized is located at the property to be
searched hereby.
Such evidence would be cancealed, destroyed, damaged, or
altered if sought by subpoena.
A no-knock warrant is not reauested
here. It is reauested that the home be searched during regular hours
in a manner least intrusive to other occupants.

(Continued on page 4)
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HEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the
eizure of said items:
(x) in the day time.

UBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO BEFORE ME thi

JUTO IN THE -THlkt) CIRCUIT C W f ,
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE
OF UTAH
'•':;,' .-..
1S/3445E

DAVID E. YOCOM
County Attorney
By: GREGORY G. SKORDAS
Deputy County Attorney
Courtside Office Building
231 East 400 South, 3rd Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Phone: (801) 363-7900

IN THE THIRD CIRCUIT COURT, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SEARCH WARRANT
No.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE, STATE OF UTAH
To any peace officer in the State of Utah.
Proof by Affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by
Detective L. Powers - SLCSO, I am satisfied that there is probable
cause to believe
That on the premises known as 1316 East 3900 South, the
eastmost unit in a duplex located on 3900 South.
The duplex is
reddish-orange brick with a pink roof and a swamp cooler in the roof.
In the City of Salt Lake, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah, there
is now certain property or evidence .described as:
Two Ninetendo Games (brain and paddles);
One Cosmo 5" TV Model CTV 701;
Two Magnavox VCP Model #VR9602AT0l;
One Tote Vision VCP;
One 9" Samsung TV;
One 9" Sony TV;
One Alpine AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
Panasonic Stereo AM/FM Cassette Car Stereo (black);
Two Samsong VCP Model VP 2215.
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and that said property or evidence:
(x) was unlawfully acauired or is unlawfullv possessed, or
(x) has been used to commit or conceal a public offense, or
(x) is being possessed with the purpose to use it as a means
of committing or concealing a public offense, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a party to the illegal conduct, or
(x) consists of an item or constitutes evidence of illegal
conduct, possessed by a person or entity not a party to
the illegal conduct,
[Note requirements of Utah Code
Annotated, 77-23-3(2)]
You are therefore commanded:
(x) in the day time
to make
a search
of the above-named
or described
person(s),
vehicle(s), and premises for the herein-above described property or
evidence and if you find the same or any part thereof, to bring it
forthwith before me at the Third Circuit Court, County of Salt Lake,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to
the order of this court,
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this

/ < ^ day of May. 1989,

JUDJGE

lls/3445E

of frit

THIRD

CIRCUIT

COURT

